

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OSLO 01635 01 OF 02 051617Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 ACDA-12
TRSE-00 DLOS-09 OES-07 EB-08 CG-00 DOTE-00 MCE-00
/102 W

-----125505 051633Z /14

O P 051540Z APR 78

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5577

INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

USMISSION USNATO

USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 1635

SECDEF FOR OASD/PA/GOLDSMITH

USCINCEUR FOR ECPAO/MAJ WINSETT

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP, NO

SUBJ: SECDEF VISIT TO NORWAY

1. EMBASSY ANTICIPATES THAT DURING SECDEF'S TWO PRESS CON-
FERENCES IN NORWAY HE WILL BE ASKED GENERAL QUESTIONS RE-
LATING TO US-USSR RELATIONS, SALT AND EUROPEAN
SECURITY, INCLUDING PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEUTRON
BOMB (WHICH WAS DEBATED BY NORWEGIAN STORTING APRIL4);
RECENT NYT ARTICLE ON CLAYTOR MEMO RE LIMITED FUTURE ROLE
OF NAVY; PRM-10 F-16 CO-PRODUCTION PROGRAM; TWO-WAY STREET
IN ARMS PROCUREMENT; SOVIET SUBS IN BALTIC; WARSAW PACT
FORCE LEVELS VS NATO; ETC. IN ADDITION, WE EXPECT FOLLOWING
LOCALIZED SUBJECTS MAY BE RAISED, FOR WHICH WE HAVE PROVIDED
SAMPLE ANSWERS:

Q. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE DEBATE HERE IN NORWAY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OSLO 01635 01 OF 02 051617Z

RECENTLY REGARDING THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF SOVIET
FORCES IN THE KOLA PENINSULAR WITH SOME OFFICIALS OF THE
NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT STATING THAT THESE FORCES SHOULD NOT
BE VIEWED AS A THREAT TO NORWAY. WHAT DO YOU SAY TO THIS?

A. IT IS DIFFICULT TO TALK ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF SPECIFIC
SOVIET FORCES, BUT ONE CAN TALK ABOUT MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SOVIET FORCES STATIONED AT MURMANSK IS THAT THEY HAVE A VERY IMPRESSIVE MILITARY POTENTIAL. I AM SURE THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION THE CAPABILITIES OF SUCH A POWERFUL FORCE NEAR ITS BORDER.

Q. JUST PRIOR TO THE RECENT NATO EXERCISE "ARCTIC EXPRESS" IN NORWAY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO LIMIT THE PARTICIPATION OF WEST GERMANY TROOPS TO 480 MEN. THIS DECISION HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AS BEING DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST A NATO ALLY. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN ALLEGATIONS THAT THIS DECISION WAS REACHED UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE FROM KOSYGIN DURING HIS MEETING WITH NORDIC PRIME MINISTERS IN HELSINKI. WHAT IS THE VIEW OF THE USG REGARDING THIS APPARENT LIMITATION OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO MANEUVERS ON NORWEGIAN SOIL?

A. I AM NOT FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE DETAILS CONCERNING GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO MANEUVERS HERE. BUT AS I UNDERSTAND IT, GERMAN TROOPS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN NATO EXERCISES IN NORWAY FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. THE SPECIFIC LEVEL AND TYPE OF SUCH PARTICIPATION SHOULD BE AND ARE MATTERS FOR THE HOST GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER.

Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE NEED FOR PRE-STOCKAGE OF EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY ALLIED REINFORCEMENT IN NORWAY?
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 OSLO 01635 01 OF 02 051617Z

A. PRE-STOCKAGE IS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. OBVIOUSLY, WHAT IS IN PLACE HERE WHEN TROOPS ARRIVE WOULD SPEED UP THEIR DEPLOYMENT TO PLACES OF ENGAGEMENT. IT IS PRECISELY THIS SPEED WHICH WOULD BE OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO NORWAY.

Q. NORWAY HAS JUST CONCLUDED AN INTERIM FISHERIES AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION REGARDING A PORTION OF THE BARENTS SEA WHICH HAS BEEN REFERRED TO AS THE "GREY ZONE". ALTHOUGH THE US GOVERNMENT HAS SAID IT DOES NOT COMMENT ON BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AN ALLY AND ANOTHER COUNTRY, THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS THAT THE USG IS NOT HAPPY WITH THIS AGREEMENT. AMONG OTHER THINGS, IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT THIS AGREEMENT CONCERNS MORE THAN FISH AND INVOLVES MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. WHAT WOULD YOU SAY ABOUT THIS?

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OSLO 01635 02 OF 02 051603Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 ACDA-12
TRSE-00 DLOS-09 OES-07 EB-08 CG-00 DOTE-00 MCE-00
/102 W

-----125122 051632Z /14

O P 051540Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5578
INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
USMISSION USNATO
USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 OSLO 1635

SECDEF FOR OASD/PA/GOLDSMITH

USCINCEUR FOR CCPAO/MAJ WINSETT

A. YOU ARE CORRECT IN OBSERVING THAT THE USG AND ITS
REPRESENTATIVES DO NOT COMMENT ON THE BI-LATERAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN AN ALLY AND ANOTHER COUNTRY.

Q. IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED THAT THE LORAN C NAVIGATION STATIONS
IN NORWAY VIOLATE NORWAY'S BASE AND NON-NUCLEAR POLICIES
BECAUSE THEY ARE DESIGNED FOR USE BY U.S. WARSHIPS, PARTICULARLY
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES. CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE USE OF
THESE STATIONS BY US NUCLEAR SUBMARINES?

A. THESE SYSTEMS ARE FOR GENERAL NAVIGATIONAL USE BY,
FOR EXAMPLE, FISHING BOATS, CARGO SHIPS, YACHTS, ETC, AND
ARE OF NO IMPORTANCE FOR AMERICAN STRATEGIC SUBMARINES. OUR
SUBMARINES ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON ANY PARTICULAR NAVIGATIONAL
SYSTEM, AS THEY HAVE A VARIETY OF NAVIGATIONAL ALTERNATIVES
AVAILABLE TO THEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 OSLO 01635 02 OF 02 051603Z

Q. NORWAY IS PRODUCING COMPONENTS FOR F-16 AIRCRAFT UNDER
THE EUROPEAN CO-PRODUCTION PROGRAM. BECAUSE OF ITS STRICT
POLICIES REGARDING SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT OUTSIDE OF
NATO, NORWAY IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SALES OF F-16'S EQUIPPED

WITH NORWEGIAN PARTS TO NON-NATO COUNTRIES. WHAT IS THE US
DOING TO SEE THAT NORWAY'S POLICY IS RESPECTED?

A. THE USG HAS A FIRM UNDERTAKING, AS NOTED IN OUR DECEMBER-
JANUARY DISCUSSIONS WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT, TO SEEK TO ASSURE
THAT NORWEGIAN-PRODUCED PARTS ARE INITIALLY INSTALLED IN
AIRCRAFT DESTINED FOR NATO COUNTRIES.
BREMER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY VISITS, PRESS CONFERENCES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978OSLO01635
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780147-0239
Format: TEL
From: OSLO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780490/aaaacyhh.tel
Line Count: 178
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 750aeeb5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 12 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3068466
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECDEF VISIT TO NORWAY
TAGS: OVIP, SOPN, NO
To: DOD STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/750aeeb5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014